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Although the United States Supreme Court has occasionally concerned
itself with classifications by age, Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgial
appears to be the first case which deals with the constitutionality of a
maximum age for purposes of retirement. The increasing life expectancy of
Americans may prove of little use if, at an arbitrarily early age, e.g., age 50,
retirement is required and dependency on society begins. On the other
hand, for younger workers, mandatory retirement statutes assure increased
employment and promotion opportunities, thereby advancing incentive
and morale.
Government studies indicate the dramatic shift in work participation
since the passage, in recent years, of compulsory retirement laws. In 1890,
68.2% of men 65 and older were active members of the work force. 2 By 1920,
a majority of men over 65 remained in the work force.' During the early part
of the twentieth century, the proportion of people over age 65 was only 4%. 4
In the 1970's, the percentage of people 65 and older has grown to about
10%, or more than 20 million, and by the year 2000 the number will
probably be 29 million.5 Medical progress has accounted for this increase,
and the implication is to expect a more active and productive older popula-
tion. Instead, only 25% of males 65 and older were active in the 1970 work
force, 6 and a small 3.4% of all persons over 65 were working. 7 A recent
survey reports that "61 percent of all working people can expect that at a
fixed age they will be told to retire from their jobs."8 Yet 86% of the
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population believes that "nobody should be forced to retire because of age, if
he wants to continue working and is still able to do a good job."9
This article explores the constitutional issues implicated by mandatory
retirement schemes, examines some lower court decisions, and analyzes the
recent Murgia opinion.
I. DUE PROCESS AND IRREBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION
The legislative branches of the federal and state governments con-
stantly are involved in "line-drawing," whereby some people are classified
and accorded certain rights while others who are not so classified are denied
those same rights. Mandatory retirement statutes are one example of such
legislation. By enacting this type of legislation, the state creates a conclusive
statutory presumption that all individuals above a certain age are unfit, and
those below that age are fit, to continue as public employees. This presump-
tion is one procedural method by which a government decides whether
public employees may continue in their jobs. Constitutionally, public em-
ployees' rights to continued employment in the face of a conclusive presump-
tion may involve a property right under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. If a property right is involved, then the employee
cannot be deprived of this right without due process of law.' 0 At issue, then,
is whether a conclusive statutory presumption concerning the mandatory
retirement of individuals over a particular age adequately safeguards an
individual's procedural due process rights as guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment. This issue is at the heart of the Supreme Court's decisions
which have dealt with the concept of the "irrebuttable presumption,""I As is
evident from the language used by the Court, these decisions considered
whether a procedural due process violation had occurred.' 2
9. Id.
10. Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Connell v.
Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1970); Slochower v. Bd. of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956);
Wiemarn v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952). The Court in Roth discussed the
attributes of a "property" interest stating:
To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more
than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral
expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to
it.
Roth, supra at 577.
11. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. La
Fleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508
(1973); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972);
Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
12. In Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973), and United States Dep't of
Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973), the Court simply referred to "due
process" and did not use the terms "procedural" or "substantive." However, the
Court employed at least in certain aspects what was a procedural analysis. The cases
of Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971), and Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), are
primarily procedural and are so referred to by the Court elsewhere. See also Bd. of
Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,572 (1972). The language used in the
(Vol. 42
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In Carrington v. Rash'" the Court stated the issue in terms of an equal
protection problem. However, the Court used what was essentially a pro-
cedural due process analysis to decide that a Texas voting residency statute
went beyond what was necessary or reasonable to protect an admittedly valid
state interest. The Court stated that:
Texas is free to take reasonable and adequate steps. . . to see
that all applicants for the vote actually fulfill the requirement of
bona fide residence. But this constitutional provision goes beyond such
rules. "[T]he presumption here created is . . . definitely con-
clusive-incapable of being overcome by proof of the most positive
character." Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, 324.14
In going "beyond the rules" the state denied one class of persons a funda-
mental right-the right to vote-without due process of law, while other
classes of adult residents were afforded that right. This, of course, is an equal
protection problem. However, the heart of the matter is the nature of the
equal protection denial-the denial of procedural due process by the use of
an irrebuttable presumption.
The procedural due process approach is more clearly illustrated by the
analysis in Bell v. Burson15 which held that an individual's driver's license
could not be revoked without adherence to procedural due process stand-
ards. Under the Georgia statutory system involved, Georgians' driver's
licenses normally were not summarily revoked because of involvement in
automobile accidents. However, uninsured motorists' licenses were sus-
pended following an accident, regardless of fault, unless a bond was posted.
This presented an equal protection question, because uninsured motorists
were denied procedural due process (notice and a hearing prior to license
suspension) while insured motorists faced no suspension in the same situa-
tion. However, as in Carrington, there was an additional and distinct issue
concerning the procedure used to terminate the entitlement of a driver's
license. The procedure employed by the state in Bell presumed that an
Vlandis opinion further supports this, the Court stating that: "[S]tandards of due
process require that the State allow such an individual the opportunity to present
evidence showing that he is a bona fide resident entitled to the in-state rates." 412 U.S.
at 452 (emphasis added). Further, Justice Marshall in his Vlandis concurrence states
that the case dealt with "nothing more than the procedures by which the State
determines whether or not a person is a resident for tuition purposes." 412 U.S. at
455 (emphasis added). Procedural due process deals with the enforcement of public
policy as determined by the legislature. It is precisely this method of enforcement
that is the concern of the Court in irrebuttable presumption cases. While there may in
these cases be an additional equal protection problem creating a violation of substan-
tive due process, the two issues are distinguishable and do not merge into one as
suggested by some commentaries. See Note, The Conclusive Presumption Doctrine:
Equal Process or Due Protection? 72 MIcH. L. REv. 800, 821 (1974); Note, The
Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1534 (1974);
Note, Irrebuttable Presumption: An Illusory Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 449 (1975).
13. 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
14. Id. at 96 (emphasis added).
15. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
1977]
3
Abramson: Abramson: Compulsory Retirement, the Constitution and the Murgia Case
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1977
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
uninsured motorist involved in an accident was likely to be liable and to be
judgment proof. No hearing was held even on the possibilityof liability and as
a result, the Georgia procedure was held violative of procedural due process.
Bell found that the state must provide a forum to determine the reasonable
possibility of a civil judgment being rendered against an individual in order
to provide a more precise relationship between the legislation's purpose and
the uninsured motorist.
Bell and Carrington illustrate the two part analysis followed by the
Supreme Court in approaching cases involving irrebutable presumptions.
This analysis, which identified (1) the equal protection issue of whether the
classification serves a legitimate state interest; and (2) the procedural due
process issue of whether an entitlement may be terminated without adher-
ence to minimal notice and hearing standards, was also followed in Vlandis v.
Kline. 6 In Vlandis the Court held that:
[A] permanent irrebuttable presumption of nonresidence-
the means adopted by Connecticut to preserve that legitimate
interest-is violative of the Due Process clause, because it provides
no opportunity for students who applied from out of state to
demonstrate that they have become bona fide Connecticut
residents.' 7
In Cleveland Board of Education v. La Fleur18 the procedural due process
argument again was articulated. The Court stated that: "The question
before us is. . .whether the interests advanced in support of the rules of the
• ..School Boards can justify the particularprocedures they have adopted."19
La Fleur, however, treated the equal protection problem and the procedural
due process argument as two distinct issues. Thus, the court also applied an
equal protection test and considered whether mandatory maternity leave
rules were "rationally related" to admittedly justifiable state interests in
having only physically fit teachers in the classroom. This results in the
"grafting" of the equal protection clause onto the due process clause; a result
which the dissenting minority in Vlandis feared.20 The La Fleur equal
protection discussion concerned the validity of the basic class distinction
between individuals less than five months pregnant and those more than five
months pregnant in relation to articulated state objectives. Its due process
16. 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
17. Id. at 453.
18. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
19. Id. at 640 (emphasis added).
20. Chief Justice Burger, with whom Justice Rehnquist joined dissenting in
Viandis, stated that the Court's use of an irrebuttable presumption analysis:
[A]ccomplish[ed] a transference of the elusive and arbitrary "compelling
state interest" concept into the orbit of the Due Process Clause, [and that in
the future] [there will be ... some ground for a belief that the Court now
engrafts the "close judicial scrutiny" test onto the Due Process Clause
whenever we deal with something like "permanent irrebuttable
presumptions."
Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 460, 462 (1973).
[Vol. 42
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discussion concerned the use of a five month cut-off as a procedural device
to determine which individuals fit within each classification. 21 The Court
found the presumptive procedure in La Fleurto be a violation of procedural
due process, because its classification was overinclusive and therefore pro-
cedurally defective because of substantive defects.
[T]he question is whether the rules sweep too broadly. . . for
the provisions amount to a conclusive presumption that every
pregnant teacher who reaches the fifth or sixth month of preg-
hancy is physically incapable of continuing. 22
The fact that the existence of an equal protection problem is evidence that
the requirements of procedural due process are not being met illustrates the
manner in which the procedural due process requirements and the equal
protection clause overlap.
In Stanley v. Illinois23 the basic validity of the classification involved was
considered.2 4 Stanley dealt with both a conclusive statutory presumption that
all unmarried fathers, upon the mother's death, were "unfit" parents and an
equal protection problem involving the fact that, with no rational basis for
the distinction, all mothers and married fathers were awarded a hearing on
parental fitness while unmarried fathers were not. The Supreme Court
stated:
We have concluded that all Illinois parents are constitutionally
entitled to a hearing on their fitness before their children are
removed from their custody. It follows that denying such a hearing
to Stanley and those like him while granting it to other Illinois
parents is inescapably contrary to the Equal Protection Clause. 25
The Court also considered the notion of procedure by presumption and its
validity under the due process clause. It stated that it granted certiorari:
to determine whether this method of procedure by presumption
could be allowed to stand in light of the fact that Illinois allows.
married fathers-whether divorced, widowed or separated-and
mothers-even if unwed-the benefit of the presumption that they
are fit to raise their children. 26
The first part of the passage articulates the due process problems involved in
the case; the second examines the equal protection issue and its bearing on
21. The difficulty with La Fleuris that despite the consideration of due process
by the Court, no due process claim was made by the respondents. This causes a lack of
clarity and demarcation of the issues presented in the Court's opinion.
22. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632, 644 (1974) (emphasis
added).
23. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
24. In Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) and Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S.
441 (1973), the valid interests of the state in creating a distinction between certain
groups of individuals were not disputed. Rather, it was the method employed in
determining the members of the classes which was found impermissible.
25. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972).
26. Id. at 647.
19771
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determining the validity of the "presumption procedure" in light of due
process requirements. These appear to be distinct issues, not due process
masquerading as a convoluted equal protection analysis.2 7
The equal protection problem in mandatory retirement schemes is
similar to that presented in Stanley. All public employees could take a
physical examination to determine fitness. Instead, in mandatory retire-
ment schemes, those over the mandatory retirement age are legislatively
determined to be unfit regardless of the physical examination results. Thus,
while those under the mandatory retirement age are afforded an opportu-
nity for a meaningful due process proceeding, e.g., an annual physical
examination to determine continued fitness, those over the age do not
receive the same treatment. The due process issue in mandatory retirement
schemes involves the "procedure by presumption" that all public employees
older than the legislatively-designated age are conclusively unfit for con-
tinued employment. The question presented, then, is can this "procedure by
presumption" withstand a due process analysis?
In United States Department of Agriculture v. Murry,28 the Court held that
ease of administration cannot justify the use of procedures which are a
denial of due process. In a concurring opinion Justice Marshall expressed
his view that if the private interest involved is a primary interest, then a
hearing is necessary to satisfy due process requirements and procedure by
presumption is inadequate. 9 A significant property interest is involved in
mandatory retirement statutory schemes-the interest in continued em-
ployment3 o Therefore, Muny and the procedural due process requirements
of the fourteenth amendment appear applicable to mandatory retirement
cases.
However, in Weinberger v. Salfi,3 ' the Court appeared to restrict the
applicability of the irrebuttable presumption approach to procedural due
process problems. In rejecting a challenge to the Social Security Act's
27. Justice Powell in his concurrence in the result in La Fleurexpressed the view
that:
If the Court nevertheless uses "irrebuttable presumption" reasoning selec-
tively, the concept at root often will be something else masquerading as a
due process doctrine. That something else, of course, is the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632, 652 (1974).
28. 413 U.S. 508 (1973).
29." Justice Marshall, in positing what he believes to be the "analytic underpin-
nings" of the majority opinion, states that:
In short, where the private interests affected are very important and the
governmental interest can be promoted without much difficulty by a
well-designed hearing procedure, the Due Process Clause requires the
Government to act on an individualized basis, with general propositions
serving only as rebuttable presumptions or other burden-shifting devices.
United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 518 (1973).
30. See: note 10 supra.
31. 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
(Vol. 42
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duration-of-relationship requirements, Justice Rehnquist reiterated3 2 his
view that the wholesale extension of the irrebuttable presumption holdings
of Stanley, Vlandis and La Fleur classifications which concern the distribution
of government funds
would turn the doctrine of those cases into a virtual engine of
destruction for countless legislative judgments which have hereto-
fore been thought wholly consistent with the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution.33
Notwithstanding Justice Rehnquist's recent pronouncement, it is submitted
that mandatory retirement schemes involve the same types of "fact" deter-
minations-the physical "fitness'or "unfitness" of a public employee-as did
the factual inquiries in Stanley, Vlandis and La Fleur. Thus, even under the
restricted construction of the irrebuttable presumption doctrine's applica-
bility, it is arguable that a hearing is necessary prior to the mandatory
retirement of public employees. The statistics involved in age-job capacity
are no more weighty than those used in correlating unwed fathers with
fitness or unfitness in caring for children.34
32. In his Murry dissent, he said:
There is a qualitative difference between, on the one hand, holding
unconstitutional on procedural due process grounds presumptions which
conclude factual inquiries without a hearing on such questions as fault, Bell
v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971), the fitness of an unwed father to be a
parent, Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), or, accepting the majority's
characterization in Vlandisv. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973), residency, and, on
the other hand, holding unconstitutional a duly enacted prophylatic
limitation on the dispensation of funds which is designed to cure systemic
abuses. United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 524
(1973).
More important, his La Fleur dissent spoke of:
...the jeopardy in which the Court's opinion places longstanding statutes
providing for mandatory retirement of government employees. . .Since
[the] right to pursue an occupation is presumably on the same lofty footing
as the right of choice in matters of family life. . ., the Court will have to
strain valiantly in order to avoid having today's opinion lead to the
invalidation of mandatory retirement statutes for governmental em-
ployees. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632, 659 (1974).
33. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 772 (1975). In Salfi, Murry was distin-
guished as a case involving an irrational classification.
34. In Stanley the State spoke of "general disinterest of putative fathers in their
illegitimate children" and that "in most instances, the natural father is a stranger to
the child." Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 654, n.6. The Court in Stanley, noted
however, that there was no sociological data by which lower courts were justifying the
assumption that an illegitimate child reared by his natural father is less likely to
receive a proper upbringing than one reared by his natural father who was at one
time married to his natural mother. Id. at 654, n.7.
The statistical data concerning age-job capacity is equally inconclusive. U.S.
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1223, Comparative job
Performance byAge: Large Plants in the Men's Footwear and Household Furniture Industries
(1957) (slight decrease in productivity among older workers); U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1273, Comparative Job Performance by Age:
1977]
7
Abramson: Abramson: Compulsory Retirement, the Constitution and the Murgia Case




In most situations, a statutory classification is considered valid 35 if it
includes all, but only those, persons who are similarly situated with respect to
the purpose of the law. In decisions dealing with economic regulations,3 6 the
Court has used concepts like "purpose '3'7 and "similar situations"38 which
give considerable latitude to state legislatures in determining the permissible
scope of classifications. However, when either "suspect classifications"3 9 or
"fundamental rights"4 0 are involved, legislative discretion is narrowed con-
Office Workers (1960) (greater productivity by older workers); CANADIAN DEP'T OF
LABOUR, ECONOMICS AND RESEARCH BRANCH, Age Performance in Retail Trade (1959)
(older department store workers were equal to or better than those younger, with
peak performance at ages 51-55); Clay, A Study of Performance in Relation toAge at Two
Printing Works, 11 JOURNAL OF GERONTOLOGY 417 (1956) (machine compositors and
hand compositors showed a slight decline in productivity after age fifty, while older
readers maintained a higher level of performance than younger ones until retire-
ment); HAKKINEN, TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS AND DRIVER CHARACTERISTICS (1958) (this
study of Helsinki bus and tram drivers found no correlation between age and
accidents); NORMAN, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND CONGRESS OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR ACCIDENTS AND TRAFFIC MEDICINE, Professional Drivers
and Road Safety (1966) (this study on London bus drivers found the safest age range to
be 60-64, with no significant decline for those older); Palmer and Brownell, Influence
of Age on Employment Opportunities, 48 MONTHLY LABOR REV. 765 (1939) (these
researchers found no correlation between age and output in surveying six New
England companies); Walker, The Job Performance of Federal Mail Sorters by Age, 87
MONTHLY LABOR REV. 296 (1964) (this study of postal workers found a slight
decrease, less than 10%, in performance after age 60).
35. The exception is where the statute involves a "fundamental right" or
"suspect category." In those cases a statute is not automatically presumed constitu-
tional. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
36. Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Daniel v. Family
Security Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220 (1949); Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336
U.S. 106 (1949); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
37. In Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934), the Court stated that:
So far as the requirement of due process is concerned, and in the absence
of other constitutional restriction, a state is free to adopt whatever
economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and
to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose. . . .If the laws
passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative
purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of
due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect renders
a court functus officio.
38. In Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948), the Court stated:
The Constitution in enjoining the equal protection of the laws upon States
precludes irrational discrimination as between persons or groups of per-
sons in the incidence of a law. But the Constitution does not require
situations "which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as
though they were the same." Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940).
Id. at 466.
39. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
40. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
(Vol. 42
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siderably. In dealing with the constitutionality of mandatory retirement
laws, therefore, it is important to determine whether age is a "suspect
category" or whether employment is a "fundamental right." If neither of the
aforementioned is found to be true, then the state's burden of justification
for the classification is substantially reduced.4 ' On the other hand, if a
"suspect classification" or "fundamental right" is involved, a "very heavy
burden of justification"4 2 is placed upon the state, and the classification is
subject "to the most rigid scrutiny."4 3
In determining the applicability of a "strict scrutiny" standard of review
to mandatory retirement legislation, the first question presented is whether
age should be treated as a suspect classification. The Court has long
recognized a "strict" standard of review in examining classifications based on
race 4 4 and has extended this approach to cases involving discrimination
because of national origin.45 More recently, the Court held that classifica-
tions based on alienage are "inherently suspect" and, therefore, are subject
to strict judicial scrutiny. 46 Aliens, as a class, were held to be a prime example
of a "discrete and insular"47 minority for whom such heightened judicial
solicitude is appropriate. The Court has also subjected classifications based
on illegitimacy 48 and sex49 to strict scrutiny in determining their validity, but
neither has yet been held a suspect category.
Although no decision has held that discrimination against poor people
is "inherently suspect," the Court has stated that "[1]ines drawn on the basis
of wealth or property, like those of race. . . are traditionally disfavored"5
and "render a classification highly suspect and thereby demand a more
exacting judicial scrutiny."'" Hence, by the late 1960's it appeared that the
Court was adopting an attitude that would permit the addition of wealth (or
lack of wealth) to the existing list of suspect categories. However, despite this
41. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic
Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
42. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967).
43. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
44. Brown v. Bd. of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Strauder v. West Virginia,
100 U.S. 303 (1880).
45. Early decisions on racial classifications which discriminated against Blacks
were later extended to include discrimination dealing with any racial classifications.
While upholding the imposition of a curfew on Japanese individuals during World
War II, the Court stated that, "all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a
single racial group are immediately suspect," and that, "courts must subject them to
the most rigid scrutiny." Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). This
approach has been extended to cases involving discrimination because of national
origin. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
46. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
47. Id. at 372.
48. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Levy v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
49. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
50. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966).
51. McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969).
19771
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trend, in recent decisions the Court has indicated an increasing reluctance to
identify wealth as a suspect classification. In San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez,52 appellee's claim for relief alleged discrimination based
upon wealth in state funding of education. The Court stated that:
[I]t is clear that appellees' suit asks that Court to review a
system that allegedly discriminates against a large, diverse, and
amorphous class, unified only by the common factor of residence in
districts that happen to have less taxable wealth than other districts.
The system of alleged discrimination and the class it defines have none of
the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class is not saddled with such
disabilities, orsubjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment or
relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.53
Even under the "liberal" view adopted by Frontiero v. Richardson,5 4 the
labeling of age as a suspect category is questionable. In applying "strict
scrutiny" criteria to sex-based classifications. Frontiero55 found that sex was
similar to race and national origin in that it was an "immutable characteris-
tic" determined "solely by accident of birth." Moreover, what distinguished
suspect sex-based classifications from nonsuspect classifications dealing with
intelligence or physical disability was that the sex characteristic frequently
bore no relation to the ability to perform or contribute to society. This
language arguably might apply to age classification, for age at times may not
bear a relation to functioning ability. 56 However, the other factors present in
the sex discrimination cases arguably are not found in age discrimination 57
situations, and the reference of these factors may weigh heavily against
applying a Frontiero strict scrutiny analysis to age discrimination-mandatory
retirement cases. 58
52. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
53. Id. at 28 (emphasis added).
54. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
55. Id. In Frontiero, only Justices Brennan, Douglas, White and Marshall
concluded that sex was an inherently suspect category.
56. The appellant in Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 96 S. Ct. 2562(1976), did not cite any conclusive empirical data in this regard, but see note 34 supra.
57. It is questionable if there has been any "purposeful unequal treatment" or
relegation to a position of "political powerlessness" as discussed by the Court in San
Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). However, it is
also arguable that once a particular age is reached, people are saddled with the
disability of mandatory retirement which could be viewed as equivalent to a history of
purposeful unequal treatment. Yet the current expansion of political power of the
elderly is evidenced by the advances of political lobbies for the elderly. Further, the
elderly have never been denied the right to vote, as were women, and increasing age
has a tendency, at least at times, to bring increasing respect for the experience of life
that accompanies it. In contrast, one's status as a woman has traditionally caused a
diminution in the amount of respect and significance attached to one's beliefs and
opinions.
58. The courts have in fact upheld mandatory retirement statutes in other
situations. See, e.g., Airlines Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1960);
McCarthy v. Sheriff of Suffolk County, 322 N.E.2d 758 (Mass. 1975); Mcllvaine v.
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The second question presented in determining the applicability of a
"strict scrutiny" standard of analysis to mandatory retirement legislation is
whether employment is a "fundamental right." The Court had ruled that
any classification which penalizes the exercise of a fundamental constitu-
tional right is subject to close review. Thus, classifications which inhibit the
right to travel among the states,59 the right to vote, 60 the right to procreate, 61
and the right to an appeal from a criminal conviction62 have been subjected
to strict scrutiny as potentially violative of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment.63 On the other hand, the Court has rejected the
argument that the need for shelter is a fundamental right, stating that "the
Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every social and
economic ill."64 This position was also taken in San Antonio Independent School
District where the Court stated that "social importance is not the critical
determinant for subjecting state legislation to strict scrutiny. '65 In the
present situation, it appears that the right to work must logically fall into this
area of "social and economic ills" and is not a situation calling for "strict
scrutiny" on the part of the judiciary.
In San Antonio Independent School District the Court did not consider
education to be a fundamental right and, in speaking of past fundamental
rights cases, stated:
[T]he lesson of these cases [concerning fundamental rights]
. . . is plain. It is not the province of this Court to create substantive
constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the
laws. Thus, the key to discovering whethei education is "funda-
mental" is not to be found in comparisons of the relative societal
significance of education as opposed to subsistence or housing [or]
by weighing whether education is as important as the right to travel.
Rather the answer lies in assessing whether there is a right to education
explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.66
Because the Constitution does not explicitly guarantee a fundamental right
to employment,67 one must argue its existence by implication.
Pennsylvania, 454 Pa. 129, 309 A.2d 801 (1973), appeal dismissed, 415 U.S. 986 (1974).
See text accompanying notes 115-41 infra.
59. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
60. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
61. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
62. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
63. See: text accompanying note 35 supra.
64. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56,74 (1972). For the view that employment is
within the concept of fourteenth amendment "liberty" and is a fundamental right, see
notes 160-63 and accompanying text infra.
65. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguiz, 411 U.S. 1, 32 (1973).
66. Id. at 33 (emphasis added).
67. While there are early decisions which emphasize the importance of employ-
ment, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1928); Traux v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915);
Butchers' Union Slaughter-house & Livestock Trading Co. v. Crescent City Live-
Stock Landing & Slaughter-house Co., 111 U.S. 746 (1884), this has never been
expanded to the holding that employment is a fundamental right. Rather, later
1977]
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The Court in Griswold v. Connecticut 8 recognized the ninth amend-
ment6 l9 as a means for arguing the existence of a fundamental right when the
right was not explicitly enunciated in the first eight amendments to the
Constitution. The specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights were viewed to be
surrounded by certain "penumbras" 70 which made the specific guarantees
"meaningful" and gave them "life" and "substance." However, while Gris-
wold seems to invite an expansion of the concept of fundamental rights, it is
important to note that Griswold concerned rights emanating from the first
amendment. Alleged violations of first amendment rights traditionally have
been viewed as requiring extremely careful analysis in their own right in
comparison to alleged violations of other constitutional rights.7' Therefore,
because first amendment rights are not involved, applying the Griswold
language to an argument that employment is a fundamental right is less than
dispositive of the issue.
Since the Griswold decisions, the Court has expressed the much nar-
rower fundamental rights standard enunciated in San Antonio Independent
School Distrit.72 In addition, in Belle Terre v. Boraa, 73 the Court stated
explicitly that "fundamental right" included "voting," "the right of associa-
tion," "access to the courts," or "any right of privacy." 74 Thus employment,
while considered a "property right" in certain situations, 75 is not yet consid-
ered a "fundamental right." Because it is likely that neither age will be
opinions are expressed in terms of procedural due process based on the considera-
tion that a right to continued employment is a property interest which cannot be
taken without the requirement of due process. Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593
(1973); Bd. of Regents v. Rbth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S.
183 (1952). This is very different from a holding that employment itself is a
fundamental right, for the Court has explicitly rejected the notion that a unliateral
expectation of continued employment demands even the procedural due process
discussed above. See text accompanying notes 10-34 supra.
68. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
69. "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST, amend.
Ix.
70. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
71. See Dejonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937), where the Court states,
"[t]he right is one that cannot be denied without violating those fundamental
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all civil and political
institutions .... "; Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949), where the majority
opinion of Justice Reed speaks of the "preferred position of freedom of speech";
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941);
Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
72. It is arguable that the Court's statement concerning "explicit" and
"implicit" guarantees in San Antonio is equivalent to the Griswold discussion of
"penumbras." However, in general it would seem that "penumbra" would allow for
greater flexibility than "implicit" since "implicit" entails at least some basis in the
actual tatutory language while "penumbra" does not.
73. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
74. Id. at 7.
75. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
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labeled as a suspect classification nor employment labeled a fundamental
right, the proper standard of review for mandatory retirement statutes
under the two-tier analysis76 promulgated by the Warren Court appears to
be minimal scrutiny-a showing merely of a rational basis for the
classification.
B. Rational Relation Test
Even though a classification may not involve a suspect category or a
fundamental right, it may still be found to be a denial of fourteenth
amendment equal protection under the rational relation test. Equal protec-
tion decisions recognize that a state cannot function both without classifying
its citizens for various purposes and without treating some citizens differ-
ently than others. In ordinary cases of statutory interpretation, a reviewing
court usually follows the policy set by the legislature and avoids the imposi-
tion of its own policy views. However, if the court finds that the statute either
furthers an impermissible "purpose" or state interest or serves no "rational
relation" to a permissible purpose, the statute may be subject to attack as a
denial of equal protection of the law.
In determining the "purpose" of a statute, the court attributes a
purpose to the statute that will uphold its constitutionality, even though this
may not be the most likely purpose.7 7 However, if the purpose of the statute
is clearly discriminatory, the statute will be held to deny equal protection.
Such a classification results in a denial of equal protection not because it is
arbitrary, but because its purpose is impermissible. 78 If the purpose of the
statute is found to be permissible, then it must be determined whether the
statutory classification is "rationally related" to achieving the permissible
purpose. If the statute is not so related, it may be held unconstitutional as
violative of equal protection.
Analysis of whether a statutory classification is rationally related to a
permissible purpose may produce a judicial finding that the statute is
"underinclusive" or "overinclusive." A statute is underinclusive when it
benefits or burdens persons in a manner that furthers a legitimate purpose
76. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Modelfora NewerEqual Protection, 86 HARV. L. Rzv. 1,
24 (1972). Under the "two-tiered system" the choice of tier, whether it be that of
"strict scrutiny" or "minimum rationality," tends to determine the results. In the vast
majority of cases, if strict scrutiny is applied, the legislation is invalidated; and if the
minimum rationality standard is applied, the legislation is upheld. The observation
has been made by Professor Gunther that there is a trend in recent Supreme Court
decisions toward the use of a middle ground of "intensified scrutiny" or "sliding
scale" approach. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). However,
the Court has not yet articulated its adoption of this new approach.
77. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
78. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). For factors involved in the
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but does not confer the same benefit or place the same burden on others
similarly situated. Underinclusion may be found to be so arbitrary that it
constitutes a denial of equal protection. 79 At times, however, the courts have
held that such underinclusion does not constitute a denial of equal protec-
tion. These holdings were prompted by judicial deference to a legislature's
discretion in dealing with particular harms that are considered acute."
In many factual contexts, the courts' toleration of underinclusion may
be simply a recognition that persons similarly situated with respect to a
statute for one purpose may be differently situated in other respects., In
contrast, if a statute is found to be overinclusive, it includes not only those
similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the statute, but also those
who are not so situated.8 2 Overinclusion would appear to be more onerous
than underinclusion because overinclusion imposes a burden on persons
who do not belong in a designated class, while underinclusion merely fails to
impose the burden on all persons who are similarly situated.
Mandatory retirement statutes are most subject to attack on the
grounds that the statute is not rationally related to a permissible purpose. a8
However there are some problems with such an attack. While involving
important individual interests, state mandatory retirement statutes also
involve state economic and social regulations, and these regulations nor-
mally receive a high degree of respect from the Court.8 4 Moreover, the
Court has deferred to a state's selection of its own officers and agents,8 5 and a
state has been held to have an undeniable right to require high standards of
qualification for its personnel.8 6 Undoubtedly, statutes which regulate a
state's police could fit into this framework.
In Murgia v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts Board of Retirement8 7 the
district court limited its inquiry to the single issue of whether a classification
based solely on attaining age fifty for mandatory retirement of state police
officers lacks a rational basis in furthering any permissible state interest. The
"rational basis" test used by the district court had been articulated earlier by
the Supreme Court:
It is necessary to say that the "equal protection of the laws"
required by the Fourteenth Amendment does not prevent the
States from resorting to classification for the purposes of legisla-
tion. Numerous and familiar decisions of this court establish that
79. Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966).
80. Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); West Coast Hotel Co.
v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
81. Comment, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV.
1065, 1084 (1969).
82. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
83. See text accompanying notes 77-82 supra.
84. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1970).
85. Kotch v. Bd. of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 557 (1946).
86. Schware v. Bd. of Bar Examiners of New Mexico, 353 U.S. 232,239 (1957).
87. 376 F. Supp. 753, 755 (D. Mass. 1974).
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they have a wide range of discretion in that regard. But the classifica-
tion must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of
difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be
treated alike. 88
This test affords the state broad discretion. In addition, since under this test
a statute is presumed valid,89 the burden is on the party challenging the
statute to overcome this presumption, 90 a principle which the district court
in Murgia recognized.9 1
As previously discussed,9 2 in applying the rational basis test, a two-step
process is required. First, a court determines whether the object or purpose
of the legislation is permissible, and then it decides whether the statutory
classification is rationally related to the legislative purpose. In the first step
of determining purpose, a court may look to the language of the statute, 93
the overall statutory scheme, 94 relevant legislative history,95 other legislative
interpretation by the state courts,96 and facts properly the subject of judicial
notice. 97 The district court in Murgia found that a valid state purpose did
exist-securing a fit police force.98 It then turned to the second step and
considered whether the classification used by the state-mandatory retire-
ment at age fifty-was "rationally related" to achieving the valid state
purpose. The district court in Murgia acknowledged that "there is a general
relationship between advancing age and decreasing physical ability to
respond to the demands of the job."9 9 Yet the court found a lack of
rationality, apparently basing its opinion on its interpretation of statistical
data and evidence introduced by Murgia of his own healthy physical
condition. It is questionable whether this was an adequate basis to support
Murgia's burden of demonstrating a lack of rationality, since under the
"rational relation" test it is the plaintiff and not the defendant who has the
burden of demonstrating a lack of rationality. 100
88. F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920) (emphasis
added).
89. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961).
90. San Antonio IndependentSchool Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973).
91. Murgia v. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement, 376 F. Supp. 753,754,756 (D.
Mass. 1974).
92. See notes 77-78 and the accompanying text supra.
93. Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 422-23 (1973).
94. Kotch v. Bd. of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 557 (1946).
95. Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc., v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582,
584-85 (1961).
96. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 451 (1972).
97. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 353 (1974).
98. Murgia v. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement, 376 F. Supp. 753,755 (D. Mass.
1974). The court dismissed the state's arguments that enhancing the morale of
younger force members or providing for rapid promotion were valid interests. Id. at
754.
99. Id. at 755. But see note 34 supra.
100. See text accompanying notes 86-88 supra.
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The Supreme Court has recognized that "every line drawn by a legisla-
ture leaves some out that might well have been included. That exercise of
discretion, however, is a legislative, not a judicial, function."''1 1 Determina-
tions concerning age involve complex judgments about relationships be-
tween age and physical and psychological capabilities. Recently, the Su-
preme Court observed in another area involving conflicting medical opinion
that:
When Congress undertakes to act in areas fraught with medi-
cal and scientific uncertainties, legislative options must be espe-
cially broad and courts should be cautious not to rewrite legislation,
even assuming arguendo, that judges with more direct exposure to
the problem might make wise choices. 10 2
The legislation under examination in Murgia is not unique, although
Massachusetts does use a lower age than most state statutes as a basis for
classification.' 0 3 Every state, as well as the federal government, has estab-
101. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8 (1974) (footnotes omitted).
102. Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417,427 (1974) (concerning Title II of
Narcotics Rehabilitation Act of 1966).
103. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN: ch. 32, § 26(3)(a) (1976). A recent survey indicates
that of the 23 states with separate State Police Departments, 17 have prescribed
mandatory retirement at age 60 or lower and five have provided for retirement at age
65 or above. DIVISION OF STATE AND PROVINCIAL POLICE, INTERNATIONAL ASS'N OF
CHIEFS AND POLICE: COMPARATIVE DATA REPORT, 1974 at 109 (1975). Other state
statutes prescribing mandatory retirement for state police: ALA. CODE tit. 55, §
460(1)(e) (1973) (60 years or with evidence of fitness); ALASKA STAT. § 39.35.680(1 1)
(1975) (55 years); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-781.01(23) (1974) (65 years); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 42-455C (1975) (65 years); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 20980 (West Supp.
1976) (60 years); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-50-204(3) (1974) (65 years); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 5-162(c)(2) (1976) (70 years); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 8323(a)
(1974) (55 years or 20 years service); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 321.18(1) (1975) (65 years);
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 92A-217-218 repealed by Acts of 1949, p. 70 (1972) (no age);
HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 88-73(2) (1975) (70 years); IDAHO CODE § 59-1310(1) (1976)
(60 years); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121, § 307.12-1 (1976) (60 years); IND. CODE §
10-1-1(h)(1) (1973) (70 years); IOWA CODE ANN. § 97A.6(1)(b) (1972) (65 years);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-4975 (1972) (60 years); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16.505(15)
(1975) (55 years); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.1426.1 (1976) (65 years); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 5, § 1121 (c) (1976) (65 years or 20 years service); MD. ANN. CODE art. 88B, §
53(1)(c) (1975) (60 years); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.105 (1967) (56 years); MINN.
STAT. § 352B.20 repealed by Laws 1973), c. 178, § 22 (1976) (no age); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 21-29-245 (1975) (60 years); RSMo § 104.080 (1971) (65 years); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 31-216 (1961) (60 years); NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-452(2) (1974) (60 years); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 286.510(2) (1973) (55 years and 30 years service); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 103:12 (1975) (65 years); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 53:5A-8(b) (1976) (65 years);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-2-6(B) (1972) (61 years); N.Y. EXEC. § 228(1) (McKenney
1972) (62 years); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 135-14 (1974) (65 years); N.D. CENT. CODE §
39-03A-18 (1972) (60 years); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5505.16 (1971) (55 years);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 2-305(a) (1975) (55 years); ORE. REV. STAT. § 237.129(1) (1975)
(60 years); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 5102 (1976) (50 years); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §
45-21-16(a) (1975) (70 years); S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-103(2) (1976) (72 years); S.D.
COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 3-12-47(35) (1974) (55 years); TENN. CODEANN. § 8-3905(b)
(1975) (60 years); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6228a, § 5.(A)(1) (1975) (60years);
I
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lished general mandatory retirement ages for its employees. 0 4 Most states
and the federal government, though, have prescribed lower mandatory
retirement ages for police officers and other occupations demanding a
special need for alertness, strength, and stamina than for those performing
in less strenuous capacities.105 The reasonableness of such provisions has
been upheld generally in several cases. 106 On the other hand, federal
legislation such as the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
expresses the view that classifications based on age in an employment
context are subject to certain restrictions. 0 7 Therefore, the state is not given
unbridled discretion in setting its employment policies.
UTAH REv. ANN. § 49-11-8(39) (1970) (55 years); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 455(13)(B)
(1972) (55 years); VA. CODE ANN. § 51-150(a) (1974) (65 years); WASH. REV. CODE §
43.43.250(1) (1970) (60 years); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 15-2-28 (1972) (55 years); Wis.
STAT. § 41.02(23) (1975) (55 years); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 31-11.7(d) (1975) (65 years);
Federal Law Enforcement and Firefighter Personnel, 5 U.S.C. § 8335(g), (55 years or
20 years service, whichever comes later).
104. In 1972 it was estimated that 84 percent of all state and local public
employees 'were covered under government retirement plans. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STATISTICS ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPT. OF COM-
MERCE CENSUS OF GOVERNMENT 1972, 6 TOPICAL STUDIES No. 1, Employee Retirement
Systems of States and Local Governments, 11-23 (1973).
105. In McCarthy v. Sheriff of Suffolk County, 322 N.E.2d 758, 763-64 (Mass.
1975), the court stated in support of this practice, that:
Examination of the various groups established by the statute discloses a
legislative intent to provide for earlier retirement of those government
officers concerned with the safety of the public. Thus, the statute provides
for the early retirement of State Police officers, and other law enforcement
personnel and those employed in positions involving potential danger to
the safety of the public are also classified in groups having an earlier.
retirement age than that of general officials and employees. We find this
classification to be clearly rational. . . . The sudden incapacitation of a
government employee who is directly responsible for the safety of others
presents a far greater danger to the public than that of an employee sitting
behind a desk or doing general labor.
106. McCarthy v. Sheriff of Suffolk County, 322 N.E.2d 758 (Mass. 1975);
McIlvaine v. Pennsylvania State Police, 454 Pa. 129, 309 A.2d 801 (1973), appeal
dismissed, 415 U.S. 986 (1974); Airlines Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892
(2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 962 (1962).
107. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1967). The declared purpose of the ADEA is that:
(1) in the face of rising productivity and affluence, older workers find
themselves disadvantaged in their efforts to retain employment, and
especially to regain employment when displaced from jobs;
(2) the setting of arbitrary age limits regardless of potential for job
performance has become a common practice, and certain otherwise desir-
able practices may work to the disadvantage of older persons;
(3) the incidence of unemployment, especially long-term unemployment
with resultant deterioration of skill, morale, and employer acceptability is,
relative to the younger ages, high among older workers; their numbers are
great and growing; and their employment problems grave;
(4) the existence in industries affecting commerce, of arbitrary discrimina-
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Age classifications have been upheld in various situations, including
voting, 0 8 jury service, 0 9 selective service, 0 and classification of tax exemp-
tions.'I" However, it may be argued that the factor which distinguishes the
classification in Murgia from these other situations is that in Murgia the
group that is subject to age classification has already been screened and
classified for the same purpose as that motivating the statutory classification.
This screening occurs through the periodic physical examination which is
mandatory after a state police officer reaches age forty. This fact arguably
makes the statutory classification "irrational", since the mandatory retire-
ment statute in actuality serves to eliminate, by its overbreadth, those very
officers which the mandatory physical examination statute seeks to retain-
those "physically fit." 112 An elaborate medical screening system is uniformly
applied in the Massachusetts system to every police officer throughout his
career.113 The purpose of this scheme is to eliminate from the police force
(b) It is therefore the purpose of this chapter to promote employment
of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit
arbitrary age discrimination in employment; to help employers and
workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age
on employment. 29 U.S.C. § 621. However, despite these principles,
there is a defect in the ADEA in that only those persons between forty
and sixty-five are protected. 29 U.S.C. § 631. Further limitations on
the effectiveness of the act include the definition of an "employer" as
an individual "engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has
twenty-five or more employees," 29 U.S.C. § 630(b), and the exception
from ADEA protection "[w]here age is a bona fide occupational
qualification that is reasonably necessary in the normal operations of
the particular business, or where the differentiation is based on
reasonable factors other than age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(f(1) (1967).
State statutes forbidding age discrimination in employment are: ALASKA STAT.§§ 18.80.200 to 18.80.300 (1975); CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 1410 to 1433 (1976); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-122 to 31-128 (1976); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 710 to 718
(1975); GA. CODE § 54-1102 (1974); HAWAU REV. STAT. § 378-1 to 378-10 (1975);
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 601A.1 to 601A.15 (1975); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 344.010 to
344.515 (1969); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23:892-893 (1964); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
5, part 12, ch. 337, sub I-VI (1976); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, §§ 1-30 (1975); MASS.
GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 149, § 24A-K (1976); MICH. COMP. LAwS ANN. §§ 423.301 to
423.311 (1976); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 64-301 to 64-320 (1976); NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 48-1001 to 48-1009 (1974); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 613.310-430 (1973); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 354A-1 to 354A-14 (1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-1 to 10:5-38
(1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 4-33-1 to 4-33-13 (1975); N.Y. EXEC. §§ 290-301 (1975);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-01-17 (1975); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 659.010 to 659.115,659.990
(1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 951-963 (1976); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 6252-14
(1970); WASH. REV. CODE §Pa 49.60.010-49.60.320 (1976); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§
5-11-1 to 5-11-19 (1975); Wis. STAT. §§ 111.31 to 111.37 (1974).
108. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
109. United States v. Duncan, 456 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1972), vacated on other
grounds, 409 U.S. 814 (1972).
110. Smith v. United States, 424 F.2d 267 (9th Cir. 1970).
111. Scarangella v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 418 F.2d 228 (3rd Cir. 1969).
112. See text accompanying notes 10-34 supra.
113. Pursuant to the granting of authority contained in MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 22, § 9A (1976), the Commissioner of Public Safety had established comprehen-
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those officers who have become unfit to perform their duties. Thus, it is
reasonable to assume that an officer who has passed this physical examina-
tion has been determined by the Massachusetts State Police to possess all the
physical requirements necessary to meet the physical demands of his job.
The physical examination, therefoie, provides the criteria for continued
service on the force. There was no argument raised in Murgia that the
physical examination screening process was ineffective or that an officer
who is 50 is unfit even though he has passed his physical examination. The
mandatory retirement statute operates to retire an officer who has been
previously declared fit for duty. The result of the application of the statute,
therefore, is in direct contradiction to its purpose, maintaining a fit police
force, because it actually eliminates fit members of the force.
Because a state has no interest in the operation of a legislative classifica-
tion which achieves results it does not desire, 14 Massachusetts arguably had
no interest in the operation of this statute. The classification may be termed
"overbroad" and irrational since it employs a means which does not secure
the statute's purpose but which in fact causes an opposite result. Hence, the
statute would appear to fail under the "rational relation" test of equal
protection.
III. LOWER COURT DECISIONS
When faced with challenges to the provisions of compulsory retirement
systems, the vast majority of lower federal and state courts have held that
such systems are a valid exercise of the state's regulatory power. Plaintiffs
sive fitness standards entitled Medical Fitness Standards for Initial Appointment to the
Massachusetts State Police. The police were required to maintain these standards
throughout their career in order to continue to serve as state police officers. The
member's fitness was measured by individual medical examination against the
established standards at the time of initial enlistment and every two years thereafter
upon the member's biannual application for reenlistment. The examination includes
the taking of a thorough medical history, a urine examination, a blood serology, chest
x-ray, audiometric examination, and tests to determine color vision, near vision or
distant vision, blood pressure, pulse, height and weight, color hair, color eyes and
body build. The physician then examines the following areas for defects: head, face,
neck and scalp, nose, sinuses, mouth and throat, ears, eardrums, eyes, opthalmos-
copic, pupils ocular mobility, lungs and chest, heart, vascular system, abdomen,
viscera, anus and rectum, endocrine system, G-U system, upper extremities, feet,
lower extremities, spine, identifying body marks, skin-lymphatics, neurologic and
psychiatric systems. In some instances an EKG is performed. Beginning at age 40 and
continuing on an annual basis until retirement, the officer is examined using the
identical standards as applied to the initial recruit. In addition, the over-40 officer is
annually given an electrocardiogram and is tested for gastro-intestinal bleeding. If a
member is found to have a physical defect which would impair his duties and
functions as a state police officer, he is declared unfit and retired from service unless
he obtains a waiver from the Commissioner of Public Safety to continue. After the
member's sixth year in service, passage of the physical examination becomes the sole
criterion for continued service.
114. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 540 (1970).
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have had little success arguing that mandatory retirement statutes are
unconstitutional under either strict scrutiny or minimum scrutiny stand-
ards." 5 The courts have rejected both the argument that age is a "suspect"
classification and that the right to employment is "fundamental." Further, in
applying the minimum scrutiny equal protection test, both federal and state
courts have held that classifications based on age are sufficiently "reason-
able" and accordingly are constitutionally permissible.
The justification most commonly offered by governmental units for
mandatory retirement schemes is that there is a reasonable connection
between increased age and declining job capabilities and that mandatory
retirement is an administratively convenient way to insure an effective and
productive work force." 6 Aside from admininstrative convenience, the
argument is also made that compulsory retirement schemes increase the
opportunity for all qualified persons to share in public employment. 117
Neither the mass employment nor the administrative convenience argu-
ment can withstand the strict scrutiny analysis under the equal protection
clause, since administrative convenience alone is not a compelling state
interest, 118 and increasing work opportunities for qualified persons could be
achieved by a narrower means. However, under minimum scrutiny, such
arguments have been held to support a mandatory retirement plan. Because
courts have been unanimous in holding that age is not a suspect classifica-
tion, 119 it is the minimum scrutiny standard that is used by most courts, and
under minimum scrutiny the compulsory retirement statute normally is
held constitutional.
20
115. See Goult v. Garrison, Civil No. 74C-931 (N.D. Ill., May 22, 1974), appeal
docketed, No. 74-1579, 7th Cir., July 16, 1974 (minimum scrutiny); Weisbrod v. Lynn,
383 F. Supp. 933 (D.D.C. 1974), aff'd mem., 420 U.S. 940 (1975) (strict scrutiny);
Murgia v. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement, 376 F. Supp. 753 (D. Mass. 1974) (newer
equal protection).
116. Armstrong v. Howell, 371 F. Supp. 48 (D. Neb. 1974); Cookson v. Lewiston
School Dist. No. 1, 351 F. Supp. 983 (D. Mont. 1972). See note 34 supra.
117. Townsend v. County of Los Angeles, 49 C.A.3d 263, 122 Cal. Rptr. 500,
503 (2d District 1975).
118. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
119. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Howell, 371 F. Supp. 48 (D. Neb. 1974).
120. Lewis v. Tucson School Dist. No. 1,531 P.2d 199 (Ariz. 1975) (upholdinga
system which retained one mandatory retirement age for elementary and secondary
teachers and another for all other government employees); McCarthy v. Sheriff of
Suffolk County, 322 N.E.2d 758 (Mass. 1975) (upholding mandatory retirement at
ages 65 to 70 of court officers as a rational classification since court officers were in
employment positions involving potential dangers to public safety); Choura v. City of
Cleveland, 73 Ohio Op. 2d 107, 336 N.E.2d 467 (Ohio 1975) (upholding mandatory
retirement of city firemen and policemen; Delvitto v. Shope, 17 Pa. C. 436,333 A.2d
204 (1975) (holding that the establishment of a mandatory retirement age for county
employees did not violate the civil rights of deputy sheriffs); Aronstam v. Cashman,
132 Vt. 538, 325 A.2d 361 (1974) (holding that constitutionally mandated retirement
at age 70 of assistant judges promotes a legitimate state concern and does not violate
equal protection); Nelson v. Miller, 25 Utah 2d 277,480 P.2d 467 (1971) (upholding
a statute providing for mandatory retirement of district court judges at age 70 and
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In Armstrong v. Howell,121 the court applied the minimum scrutiny
standard to a suit brought under the Federal Civil Rights Act by an
involuntarily retired county hospital employee. The court found that no
deprivation of any constitutional right existed, stating that:
[T]here appears to be no question but what age is a classification
which bears a reasonable relation to the law in question and. . . age
has an inevitable and definite relationship with the ability to per-
form work. 22
Similar sentiments were expressed in Weiss v. Walsh 23 where, despite the
fact that the plaintiff, a university professor, was eminently qualified for his
position and the prognosis for his lengthy productivity was excellent, the
court held that the use of an arbitrary mandatory retirement age limit to
deny the plaintiff his employment was permissible. The Weiss court stated
that:
Notwithstanding great advances in gerontology, the era when
advanced age ceases to be of some reasonable statistical relationship
to diminished capacity or longevity is still future. It cannot be said,
therefore, that age ceilings. . . are inherently suspect, although
their application will inevitably fall unjustly in the individual
case.
124
Further, in Norman v. United States125 the court held that mandatory retire-
ment of senior grade military officers under a system designed to insure
retention of only superior officers was not a constitutional deprivation of
due process.
Plaintiffs haye used a variety of arguments in attacking mandatory
retirement statutes. They have argued that a strict standard of review should
be adopted, 126 basing this argument on two theories: that age is a suspect
category, 127 and that employment is a fundamental right. 121 In rejecting the
Supreme Court Justices at age 72); American Airlines, Inc. v. State Comm'n for
Human Rights, 29 A.D.2d 178,286 N.Y.S.2d 493 (1968); Fabio v. St. Paul, 267 Minn.
273, 126 N.W.2d 259 (1964).
121. 371 F. Supp. 48 (D. Nev. 1974).
122. Id. at 51.
123. 324 F. Supp. 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd., 461 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1129 (1973).
124. Id. at 77. Accord, Retail Clerks, Local 770 v. Retail Clerks Inel Ass'n, 359 F.
Supp. 1285 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (holding that age classifications of persons of advanced
years are neither constitutionally nor statutorily infirm).
125. 392 F.2d 255 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
126. Weisbrod v. Lynn, 383 F. Supp. 933 (D.D.C. 1974), aff'dmem., 420 U.S. 940
(1975); Retail Clerks Local 770 v. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 359 F. Supp. 1285 (C.D.
Cal. 1973).
127. Weisbrod v. Lynn, 383 F. Supp. 933 (D.D.C. 1974), aff'd mem., 420 U.S. 940
(1975).
128. Townsend v. County of Los Angeles, 49 Cal. App. 3d 263, 122 Cal. Rptr.
500 (2d Dist. 1975).
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argument that employment is a fundamental right, however, the court in
Gossman v. State Employees Retirement System' 29 stated that:
It is clear that State employment is not a vested right, but it is
extended at the will of the State, and the State may reasonably make
a mandatory retirement system as a condition of such employment,
and if this be so, it falls that the State has a right to impose such
conditions as are economically and practically sound. 130
On the issue of age as a suspect category, 31 unlike the lower court in Murgia,
the Gossman court held that:
The maintenance of morale, inducement to younger employees to
remain, inducement for older ones to quit when their skills have
diminished, special inducements for different high-quality types of
employment, and a regard for the necessity to meet competitive
provisions in other retirement acts, all are proper objectives.1 2
A procedural due process argument was made by the plaintiff in Rosen
v. Carey.13 3 The plaintiff argued that as a tenured public employee, he had a
property interest in continued public employment which was protected by
procedural due process against interference by the mandatory retirement
scheme in question. He further argued that his tenured status entitled him
to an individualized hearing on his competence to continue in his present
job. It is questionable whether this argument was correct, because the statute
which determined that the employee had a property right in his employ-
ment also contained the mandatory retirement provision, and the statute
terminated the property right that is needed for a procedural due process
claim.
Several plaintiffs3 4 have unsuccessfully attacked mandatory retirement
laws on the grounds that the laws contained a constitutionally infirm
irrebuttable presumption that all workers over a certain age were incompe-
tent. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Weinberger v. Salfi33 has
narrowed considerably the potential applicability of the irrebuttable pre-
sumption doctrine to mandatory retirement laws. In Salfi, the Court refused
to hold unconstitutional a provision of the Social Security Act 3 6 which
denied benefits to any woman who had been married to a wage earner for
less than nine months prior to his death. The Court held that the irrebut-
table presumption analysis would be inapplicable to classifications involving
129. 177 Neb. 326, 129 N.W.2d 97 (1964).
130. Id. at 103. This statement was cited with approval in Armstrong v. Howell,
371 F. Supp. 48 (D. Neb. 1974).
131. See text accompanying notes 59-76 supra.
132. Gossman v. State Employees Retirement System, 177 Neb. 325, 129
N.W. d 97 (1964).
133. Civil No. 74C-1006 (N.D. Ill., January 17, 1975) (dismissed as moot).
134. Id., Weisbrod v. Lynn, 383 F. Supp. 933 (D.D.C. 1974), aff'dmem., 420 U.S.
940 (1975); Townsend v. County of Los Angeles, 49 Cal. App. 3d 263, 22 Cal. Rptr.
500 (2d Dist. 1975).
135. 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
136. Social Security Act §§ 216(c)(5), (3)(2), 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(c)(5), (e)(2) (1970).
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eligibility for social welfare programs.13 7 The reasoning in Salfi appears to
indicate that if a statute is otherwise constitutional under due process or
equal protection grounds, it will not be struck down merely because it
contains an irrebuttable presumption.13
8
The most successful means of attack on mandatory retirement schemes
has been that of the "newer" equal protection doctrine, which appears to
have been employed to strike down mandatory retirement provisions by the
lower court in Murgia13 9 and by the Hawaii Supreme Court in Nelson v.
Miwa.140 In addition, in McIlvaine v. Pennsylvania State Police, dissenting
Justice Roberts of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court suggested that a man-
datory retirement statute might be unconstitutional under the newer equal
protection standard where no interest other than administrative conven-
ience had been advanced by the state as justification for the statute.141
However, the failure of the United States Supreme Court in Murgia to adopt
this newer approach probably renders this argument extremely weak.
Hence, in all probability state and lower federal courts will continue their
present course and uphold mandatory retirement statutes as. legitimate
exercises of the states' police power.
IV. THE MURGIA DECISION
Despite the presence of numerous arguments to the contrary, in June,
1976, the Supreme Court reversed a district court's ruling and held a
mandatory retirement statute constitutional. The per curiam opinion in
Masachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia142 addressed only the equal
protection issue, and in so doing, the Court rejected the proposition that a
"9strict scrutiny" analysis was applicable to a statutory scheme involving
compulsory retirement laws. While there is arguably a reference to an
irrebuttable presumption argument present in Justice Marshall's Murgia
dissent,143 the equal protection issue was properly the only issue before the
Court, for the district court had dealt solely with the equal protection
argument and had not considered the alternative irrebuttable presumption
issue. The Supreme Court found that the legislative classification at issue
neither "interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right" nor "operates
to the peculiar disadvantage of a suslect class."'14 4 Moreover, the Court
137. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 768-70 (1975).
138. Id. at 768-74. See also text accompanying notes 31-34 supra.
139. Murgia v. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement, 376 F. Supp. 753 (D. Mass.
1974).
140. 546 P.2d 1005 (Hawaii 1976).
141. 454 Pa. 129, 145-47, 309 A.2d 801,809-11 (1973), appeal dismissed for want
of substantive federal questions, 415 U.S. 986 (1974).
142. 96 S. Ct. 2562 (1976), rev'g, 376 F. Supp. 753 (D. Mass. 1974) (three-judge
court).
143. Id. at 2573. Justice Marshall's dissent speaks of "irrationality" in "automati-
cally terminating" individuals previously judged to be physically fit merely because
they have reached age 50.
144. Id. at 2566.
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specifically endorsed its earlier holdings145 which stated that a standard less
than that of "strict scrutiny" should be applied to state legislation restricting
the availability of employment opportunities, 146 and it further rejected the
argument that old age defines a "discrete and insular" group in need of
greater protection of the laws. 14
7
In rejecting the notion that age is a suspect category, the Court noted
that while age shares several characteristics of classifications already deemed
suspect, such as being an "immutable characteristic determined solely by
accident of birth"' 48 and "relegating the entire class . . . to inferior...
status without regard to the actual capabilities of its members,"' 49 this is an
insufficient basis upon which to create a "suspect" category. The characteris-
tics of immutability and lack of individual assessment are common to many
classifications which have never been considered suspect. On the other
hand, classifications based upon alienage, for example, are created by
statute and are therefore alterable and not immutable; yet these classifica-
tions are still considered "suspect." For the Court, then, immutability is not a
touchstone of strict scrutiny equal protection analysis.
The inquiry conducted by the Court instead focused on the "relatively
relaxed standard" or a "rational basis" analysis, 150 which presumes the
legislation in question to be valid.' 5 ' This wals the same standard of analysis
used by the district court but with a different result.152 Using this approach,
the Supreme Court quickly came to the conclusion that a permissible state
purpose was involved and that the means used by the state were rationally
related to that purpose.153 Although admitting that the state scheme was
perhaps "not the best" means to accomplish its purpose and that "the
problems of retirement have been well documented and are beyond serious
dispute,' 1 54 the Court upheld the classification on the basis of the rationality
145. Dandridge v. Williams, 396 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
146. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 96 S. Ct. 2562, 2566 (1976).
147. The Court states:
Even if the statute could be said to impose a penalty upon a class defined as
the aged, it would not impose a distinction sufficiently akin to those
classifications that we have found suspect to call for strict judicial scrutiny.
Id. at 2567.
148. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (Brennan, J., plurality
opinion).
149. Id. at 687.
150. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 96 S. Ct. 2562, 2567 (1976).
151. Id.
152. Murgia v. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement, 376 F. Supp. 753 (D. Mass.
1974).
153. The Court states:
There is no indication that [the statute] has the effect of excluding from
service so few officers who are in fact unqualified as to render age 50 a
criterion wholly unrelated to the objective of the statute.
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standard. The Court stated that "where rationality is the test, a State 'does
not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications
made by its laws are imperfect. . . .' ""I
With this decision, the Court seems to have retreated from its earlier
modification of the rigid two-tiered method of analysis into a more flexible
"sliding scale" or "newer equal protection" approach.' 56 As indicated by
Justice Marshall in his dissent in Murgia, recent inquiries into the equal
protection area had involved a more sophisticated analysis than that used by
the.Court in Murgia.15 7 This newer approach had considered (1) the charac-
ter of the classifications in question, (2) the relative importance of the
governmental benefits to the individuals in the discriminated class, and (3)
the state interests asserted in support of the classifications. 158 It was this
newer "sliding scale" approach which Marshall argued more properly
should have been applied in Murgia.
The Court in Murgia also seems to have stumbled on the question of
employment as a fundamental right. The right of the individual to engage in
any lawful occupation has been repeatedly recognized by the Supreme
Court as falling within the concept of "liberty" articulated in the fourteenth
amendment.159 Moreover, despite repeated opportunities to do so, the right
to earn a living has never explicitly been relegated to mere minimum
scrutiny by the Supreme Court. 60 Prior to Murgia several lower federal
courts' 6 1 and an increasing number of state courts162 had recognized the
155. Id.
156. Several recent Supreme Court equal protection decisions had indicated the
formation of an analytic standard lying somewhere between the rigorous strict
scrutiny approach and lax minimum scrutiny analysis. In this newer approach, the
classification is no longer assumed to be rationally related to the legislative purpose.
lnstead, the burden is placed on the party defending the classification to demon-
strate its rationality. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71 (1971).
157. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 96 S. Ct. 2562, 2569 (1976).
158. Id. SeealsoStantonv. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,
420 U.S. 636 (1975); United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 523
(1973).
159. See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923); Slaughterhouse Cases, 111 U.S. 746 (1884). The Court in Smith v.
Texas, 233 U.S. 630'(1914) stated that:
In so far as a man is deprived of the right to labor his liberty is restricted
... and is denied the protection which the law afford those who are
permitted to work. Liberty means more than freedom from servitude, and
the constitutional guarantee is an assurance that the citizen shall be
protected in the right to use his powers of mind and body in any lawful
calling.
Id. at 636.
160. Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886
(1961); Green v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474,496 (1958); Harrisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342
U.S. 580, 599 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n,
334 U.S. 410, 415-16 (1948).
161. Colorado Springs Amusements, Ltd., v. Rizzo, 387 F. Supp. 690,696 (E.D.
Pa. 1974); Cianciolo v. Members of City Council, 376 F. Supp. 719 (E.D. Tenn. 1974);
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right to work as a fundamental right requiring a strict scrutiny analysis.
While the elderly are not in the same class as those individuals classified on
the basis of race, they are arguably subject to discrimination when they are
denied an important benefit such as employment. The Court's decision,
based on the fact that it has not specifically declared the right to work to be
"fundamental" and that the elderly are not as discriminated against as
individuals in classifications based on race, disregards the significant nature
of the benefits denied and the hardships which may result.
Under the "newer equal protection" standard previously used by the
Court, those factors would have received some consideration. For this
reason, the "newer equal protection" analysis appeared to hold the most
promise for a successful challenge to mandatory retirement schemes. Under
this analysis, once the plaintiff has demonstrated a prima facie interest in
retaining his or her employment, the burden would shift to the state to prove
that there existed substantial reasons which justified the mandatory retire-
ment regulation. If the state could not prove that age represented a rational
basis for separating those individuals who were able to work from those who
were not, the mandatory retirement provision would not be upheld. Under
the "newer equal protection" approach, a classification is not judged per se
unreasonable. Rather, it is judged in the context of a particular set of facts
and circumstances. The unique facts surrounding the elderly in the context
of employment makes the "newer equal protection" analysis particularly
appropriate. The fact that the Court itself recognizes the negative sociologi-
cal results of mandatory retirement16 3 demonstrates the desirability of using
the "sliding scale" or "newer equal protection" approach. This approach
would allow a more realistic assessment of the particular issues and conse-
quences involved.
While some lower courts have failed to utilize the newer equal protec-
tion standard in economic and social areas, 16 and others have apparently
restricted its application to sex-based classifications, 165 at least one federal
appellate court has employed the newer equal protection standard in the
Corey v. City of Dallas, 352 F. Supp. 977 (N.D. Tex. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 492
F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1974).
162. SeeTown of Milton v. Civil Service Comm'n, 312 N.E.2d 188 (Mass. 1974);
York v. State, 498 P.2d 644 (Hawaii 1972.); Sailer Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 485 P.2d 529
(Cal. 1971).
163. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 96 S. Ct. 2562, 2568 (1976).
164. Hooban v. Boling, 503 F.2d 648, 650-51 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 920 (1975); Rasulis v. Weinberger, 502 F.2d 1006,1009 (7th Cir. 1974); Kersh v.
Bounds, 501 F.2d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975); Rivera v.
Chapel, 493 F.2d 1302, 1304 (1st Cir. 1974); New Rider v. Bd. of Education of
Independent School Dist. No. 1, 480 F.2d 693, 699 (10th Cir. 1973).
165. Prostrollo v. University of South Dakota, 507 F.2d 775, 781 n.8 (8th Cir.
1974) (dictum), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 952 (1975); Stern v. Massachusetts Indem. &
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socio-economic areas.1 66 In addition, several lower federal courts have
employed a similar analysis. 67 The rejection of the newer analysis by the
Supreme Court, therefore, represents a step backwards in judicial thinking,
a point which is recognized by Justice Marshall's Murgia dissent.168 Beyond
any consideration of the serious negative sociological effects -arising from
mandatory retirement is the basic fact that while older workers may not
constitute a traditionally "suspect" class, they do constitute a class subject to
recurring arbitrary discrimination in employment. 69 Yet, under the
rationale of the Murgia majority, there has been no denial of any right which
is sufficient to require a remedy.
The Murgia opinion, however, is not necessarily applicable to all man-
datory retirement situations. The state's interest in Murgia concerned the
maintenance of a physically fit police force, where physical well being and
strength are quite important. The Court based its opinion on the assumption
that physical well being and strength necessarily decrease with age. A
different result might well occur where the characteristics relevant to
employment were those other than physical strength. Arguably in employ-
ment situations involving mental ability or non-manual labor, 170 no legiti-
mate basis for mandatory retirement would exist, even under the Murgia
holding. Hence, the decision in Murgia does not necessarily imply that all
mandatory retirement laws are valid. 171 It does, however, create a troubling
precedent for the validation of such laws by lower federal and state courts.
V. CONCLUSION
Persons nearing retirement age will await future descriptions, if any, by
the Supreme Court or lower federal and state courts of jobs for which there
166. City of New York v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 923,931-32 (2d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 950 (1973).
167. SeeAmerican Trust Co. v. South Carolina State Board of Bank Control, 381
F. Supp. 313 (D.S.C. 1974); Pavone v. Louisiana State Bd. of Barber Examiners, 364
F. Supp. 961 (E.D. La. 1973), aff'd, 505 F.2d 1022 (5th Cir. 1974); Chatman v. Barnes,
357 F. Supp. 9 (N.D. Okla. 1973); Delorme v. Pierce Freightlines Co., 353 F. Supp.
258 (D. Ore. 1973).
168. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 96 S. Ct. 2562, 2570 (1976).
169. This fact was recognized by Congress in passing the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act in 1967 which states:
[I]n the face of rising productivity and affluence, older workers find
themselves disadvantaged in their efforts to retain employment ... [and]
[Tihe setting of arbitrary age limits regardless of potential... had
become a common practice. ...
29 U.S.C. § 621 (1967).
170. Lower court decisions, however, had upheld mandatory retirement in
non-physically demanding jobs. See Weiss v. Walsh, 324 F. Supp. 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1971),
aff'd, 461 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1129 (1973) (university
professor); Lewis v. Tucson School Dist. No. 1, 23 A. App. 154; 531 P.2d 199 (Ariz.
1975) (teachers); Aronstam v. Cashman, 132 Vt. 538, 325 A.2d 361 (1974) (assistant
judges); Nelson v. Miller, 480 P.2d 467 (Utah 1971) (district court judges).
171. In Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 96 S. Ct. 2562, 2573, n.8
(1976), this point is made by Justice Marshall in his dissent.
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is no rational reason for mandatory retirement. An indiscriminate rule,
which disregards individual ability or job demands and is held to constitu-
tionally require retirement upon reaching the statutory age, is without
merit.
Analysis of the issues involved in mandatory retirement statutes also
raises concern for the physchological and political problems of the aged and
the aging. Being old is regarded by the young as a moral attribute rather
than a time on the calendar. Society packages people by their age, like skin,
color or religion. Old is a certain age of a person who may be more alive than
many who are chronologically younger. However, compulsory retirement
forces people to try to prevent their new-found leisure time from becoming
loneliness and inhibits creative and constructive accomplishments by older
citizens.'7 2 Recurring issues of the Social Security system-bankruptcy,
higher withholding taxes, voluntary participation-may assume greater
importance as more mandatorily retired citizens grow dependent upon it for
economic survival.
172. In the appendix to the amicus curiae brief for Legal Services for the Elderly
Poor, Accomplishments Past the Age of 69 (1975), the American Civil Liberties
Union, the National Council of Senior Citizens and the Massachusetts Civil Liberties
Union, chronicle 175 persons who have made noteworthy contributions after
attaining 69 years of age in architecture, art, business and labor, cinema, education,
fiction and poetry, government; the American presidency, historical and political
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